We analyze the design of policies to motivate an electric utility to employ its superior knowledge of industry conditions to: (i) choose between a traditional expansion of transmission capacity and storage as a transmission asset (SATA); and (ii) deploy SATA to either substitute for transmission service or supply electricity in wholesale markets. The optimal policy di¤ers considerably from policies under active consideration, in part by paying the utility relatively little for implementing SATA. The utility often commands substantial rent from its privileged knowledge of the cost of installing and integrating SATA. However, the utility typically secures little additional rent from its superior knowledge of the likelihood of local network congestion.
Introduction
Local transmission congestion can occur on an electricity network when electricity demand at a speci…c location exceeds the amount of electricity that can be delivered to the location over existing transmission facilities. Historically, transmission capacity expansion (TCE) has been the primary means to relieve network congestion. Today, alternative remedies are available. In particular, electricity can be stored near the point of potential congestion and released to serve unusually high demand for electricity when it arises. Such use of stored electricity can avoid local congestion without having to expand the capacity of the existing transmission network.
1 Electricity storage as a transmission asset (SATA) has become economical in recent years because of sharply declining battery costs. On average, the cost of lithium-ion batteries has declined by 23% annually between 2010 and 2015 (Ardani et al., 2017) . These declining costs have led several U.S. states to set ambitious targets for SATA adoption. For example, California, New York, and New Jersey seek to implement 1,300 MW, 1,500 MW, and 2,000 MW of SATA, respectively, by 2030.
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SATA o¤ers an additional bene…t relative to TCE. If unusually high local demand for electricity ultimately does not arise, the stored electricity can be sold in wholesale electricity or ancillary services markets. The sale of electricity can generate revenue for the SATA owner, and may provide additional social bene…ts by, for example, reducing the wholesale price of electricity. SATA is thus a "hybrid" resource that can both substitute for transmission services and supply market services. The hybrid nature of SATA raises regulatory issues regarding appropriate utility compensation for SATA and the rules and conditions under which SATA can participate in energy markets (Bhatnagar et al., 2013) .
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In February 2018, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 841, which requires Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs) to establish rules that facilitate the participation of storage resources in energy markets (FERC, 2018) . Appropriate design of these rules entails many important challenges, including: (i) determining when SATA must provide transmission services and when it can participate in real-time markets; (ii) motivating utilities to employ SATA to participate in these markets when appropriate, without promoting double recovery of asset costs; and (iii) limiting any undesirable e¤ects of market participation by assets whose costs are reimbursed in part according to cost-of-service principles (California ISO, 2018a , 2018b FERC, 2017) .
We are not aware of any formal analysis of the optimal design of policies to motivate the appropriate choice between TCE and SATA and the subsequent SATA deployment. This research provides such an analysis. We analyze this optimal design in settings where the regulated utility has privileged knowledge of the likelihood of local transmission congestion and the cost of acquiring, installing, and integrating SATA. We consider policies that entail elements of the plans under active consideration in California (CAISO, 2018a,b) , which share many features with plans under study in other jurisdictions (Brooks, 2018) . We allow the regulator to specify a …xed payment to the utility (P S ) if it implements SATA and a corresponding payment (P T ) if it implements TCE. The regulator can also set the fraction (f 2 [ 0; 1 ]) of the revenue SATA generates in supplying market services that accrues to the utility. 3 In addition, the regulator can specify a critical day-ahead congestion probability ( b s 2 [ 0; 1 ]) above which SATA must stand by to supply any transmission services that might be needed the following day. 4 We …nd that the optimal regulatory policy entails a relatively small …xed payment for implementing SATA (P S ). The small payment limits the rent the utility commands from its superior knowledge of SATA costs. However, the small payment sometimes induces the utility to implement TCE even though SATA would generate a higher level of expected welfare. 5 The optimal policy also typically distorts SATA assignment. For instance, the critical congestion probability ( b s ) often is set above its e¢ cient level, so SATA is permitted to participate in real-time markets even though expected welfare would be higher if SATA were assigned to provide transmission services. The increased deployment of SATA to supply market services, coupled with revenue sharing (f > 0), can render SATA implementation particularly pro…table for the utility when (and only when) it knows that local congestion is relatively unlikely. Thus, the optimal distortion in SATA deployment helps to motivate the utility to employ its superior knowledge of congestion probabilities to implement the socially optimal choice between SATA and TCE.
Despite the regulator's best e¤orts to limit the utility's rent (in order to secure lower electricity prices for consumers), the utility often secures substantial rent from its privileged knowledge of the cost of installing and integrating SATA. However, the utility typically secures little additional rent from its superior knowledge of the likelihood of local network congestion. The limited additional rent re ‡ects in part the fact that day-ahead congestion probabilities are ultimately observed publicly, which limits the utility's ability to misrepresent its superior ex ante knowledge of the prevailing congestion probability. This …nding suggests that regulators often may be better served by improving their knowledge of SATA costs than by improving their understanding of local congestion probabilities.
We also …nd that the optimal policy can di¤er signi…cantly from the policies presently under active consideration. Furthermore, implementation of the optimal policy can secure substantial gains for consumers relative to the policies under consideration. Consequently, SATA resource(s) in the local area will be designated as a transmission asset the following day." 5 P T is set equal to the (known) cost of TCE under the optimal policy. 3 further study of potential policy options may be constructive.
We develop these …ndings and others as follows. Section 2 explains the key elements of our formal model. Section 3 analyzes the optimal procurement policy in three benchmark settings. Section 4 presents our primary …ndings. 6 Section 5 concludes and identi…es directions for future research.
Model Elements
We consider a setting where unusually high demand for electricity may occur at a given location on an electricity network. If the unusually high demand arises, it exceeds the amount of electricity that can be imported from other locations over the existing transmission facilities. The resulting network congestion imposes an expected loss of L e > 0 on electricity consumers. This loss may stem from personal inconvenience or foregone or compromised commercial transactions, for example.
As explained in the Introduction, local market congestion can be avoided by TCE or SATA. TCE serves only to eliminate transmission congestion in our model. SATA can be employed either to mitigate congestion or to perform other welfare-enhancing activities, such as selling stored electricity in wholesale markets. However, because the SATA battery cannot be recharged instantaneously, it cannot provide transmission services (i.e., be prepared to meet an unusually high local demand for electricity) in the same period (e.g., in the same day) that it provides market services (i.e., supplies electricity in a wholesale market). Consequently, a decision must be made at the start of each period whether SATA will be deployed to provide transmission services or market services.
This decision is in ‡uenced by the realization of a public signal s 2 [ 0; 1 ], which re ‡ects the probability that the unusually high local demand for electricity will arise in the coming period. In practice, this signal might re ‡ect day-ahead projections of electricity demand that are delivered to an independent system operator. When projected demand is low relative to existing transmission capacity, the probability of congestion (s) will be small, so SATA may 6 The Appendix provides the proofs of all formal …ndings.
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optimally be assigned to supply market services. In contrast, when projected demand is close to or in excess of transmission capacity, s will be relatively high, so SATA may optimally be assigned to supply transmission services.
7
The optimal choice between TCE and SATA depends in part on the relative costs of the two assets. K T > 0 will denote the cost of TCE. This cost is known to both the regulator and the utility. In contrast, given the relative novelty of using storage to mitigate local congestion, the utility is assumed to be better informed than the regulator about the …xed cost of SATA.
This cost includes the cost of acquiring the physical asset (including the battery), the cost of maintaining the asset, and the various costs associated with fully integrating the asset into network operations and ensuring its smooth, reliable functioning. 8 We assume the utility knows this …xed cost of SATA, K S 2 K S ; K S . The regulator's beliefs about K S are captured by the distribution function G(K S ) and corresponding density function g(K S ). In standard fashion, we assume
This assumption is satis…ed for many common distributions, including the uniform and normal distributions. Unlike TCE, SATA also entails a variable cost of operation. v > 0 will denote the variable cost of using SATA to supply market services or to supply the electricity required to meet unusually high local demand. v includes the cost of recharging the battery after its discharge and the depreciation cost associated with the discharge and recharge of the battery. We assume the regulator and the utility both know the magnitude of v.
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The optimal choice between TCE and SATA also depends on the likelihood that unusually high local demand for electricity will arise. If the high demand is likely, TCE can be the most economical means to eliminate the associated congestion. However, if the high demand 7 When SATA is assigned to supply transmission services, it discharges its battery and thereby substitutes for transmission services if and only if the unusually high demand for electricity arises. When SATA is assigned to supply transmission services, it cannot simultaneously supply market services. 8 Sandia (2010) reviews the many facets of this activity.
9 See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) , for example. This assumption avoids unusual properties of g( ) that can complicate the characterization of optimal policies in the presence of asymmetric information. 10 The presumed symmetric, perfect knowledge of v re ‡ects the fact that battery technologies and depreciation schedules generally are relatively well known (e.g., Arteaga et al., 2017) .
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is unlikely, SATA may be the more attractive option because it can generate surplus by supplying market services when it is not being deployed to provide transmission services.
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R 1 > 0 (R 0 > 0) will denote the revenue the utility derives from employing SATA to supply market services if the unusually high demand arises (does not arise).
will denote the incremental consumer welfare that arises when SATA is employed to supply market services and the unusually high demand arises (does not arise). This incremental welfare includes the consumer surplus that arises when an increased supply of electricity leads to a lower wholesale price of electricity.
We assume the revenue and the incremental consumer welfare that SATA generates are more pronounced in the presence of the unusually high demand for electricity (hereinafter "congestion") than in its absence. (Formally, R 1 > R 0 and M 1 > M 0 .) This assumption re ‡ects the fact that high demand for electricity tends to be associated with both congestion and high prices for wholesale electricity and ancillary services. We further assume that SATA supply of market services generates positive surplus, i.e., M 0 + R 0 > v. In addition, if congestion arises, expected welfare is higher if SATA has been deployed to provide transmission services than if it has been deployed to provide market services, i.e., L e > M 1 + R 1 .
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The local demand for electricity cannot be predicted perfectly. However, because utilities often are more knowledgeable than regulators about speci…c customer needs and network capabilities, the utility is assumed to be initially better informed than the regulator about the probability of congestion (s). The prevailing cumulative distribution function of s can be one of n 2 distributions, H 1 (s); :::; H n (s). These distribution functions are ranked by …rst-order stochastic dominance, so the probability of congestion is systematically greater when H j (s) prevails than when H i (s) prevails for all j > i (i; j 2 f1; :::; ng). 13 The utility knows 11 Sandia (2010) observes that the unusually high demand can arise very infrequently. Consequently, SATA may be able to deliver market services a large fraction of the time. 12 Formally, if L e > M 1 + R 1 , then v (welfare when SATA avoids congestion) exceeds
(expected welfare when SATA supplies market services and congestion occurs). Observe that
Thus, when SATA supplies market services, expected welfare is lower when congestion occurs than when it does not occur. 13 Formally, H 1 (s) > ::: > H n (s) for all s 2 (0; 1). 6 the prevailing distribution of s from the outset of its interaction with the regulator. The regulator knows only that distribution H i (s) prevails with probability i . Unless otherwise noted, we assume i 2 (0; 1) for each i 2 f1; :::; ng.
14 We assume congestion is su¢ ciently likely and the expected loss from congestion (L e )
is su¢ ciently pronounced that the regulator always induces the utility to implement either TCE or SATA. The regulator pays the utility P T if it implements TCE. If it implements SATA, the utility receives payment P S from the regulator and the fraction f 2 [ 0; 1 ] of the revenue generated by employing SATA to deliver market services. The remaining fraction
(1 f ) of this revenue accrues to consumers (in the form of lower retail charges for electricity, for example). The regulator also reimburses the utility for v, its variable cost of operating SATA. 15 The utility will operate as long as it anticipates nonnegative pro…t from doing so.
In addition to setting P S , P T , and f , the regulator speci…es how SATA will be deployed, depending on the realized public signal. She does so by specifying a critical congestion probability, b s 2 [ 0; 1 ], and requiring SATA to supply transmission services when the realized signal exceeds b s, while authorizing the utility to employ SATA to supply market services when s b s.
The utility will implement the asset that allows it to secure the highest (nonnegative) level of expected pro…t. The utility's pro…t when it implements TCE is:
The utility's expected pro…t when it implements SATA and when …xed cost K S and cumulative distribution function H i (s) prevail is:
Expressions (1) and (2) imply that the utility will implement SATA rather than TCE when 14 Findings 1 and 2 in Section 3.4 consider a benchmark setting where the regulator and utility both know that distribution H i (s) prevails, so i = 1 and j = 0 for all j 6 = i (i; j 2 f1; :::; ng). 15 This compensation structure re ‡ects the structure in the proposed California ISO policy (CAISO, 2018a,b) .
Alternative compensation structures are discussed below.
7 distribution H i (s) prevails if:
The regulator seeks to maximize expected consumer welfare, which is the di¤erence between: (i) the sum of the incremental consumer welfare generated when SATA provides market services and the fraction (1 f ) of the revenue from such activity that is awarded to consumers; and (ii) the sum of variable SATA costs, payments to the utility, and the losses that consumers incur when unmitigated congestion arises (because SATA provides market services). Formally, the regulator's problem, [RP] , is to choose P T , P S , f 2 [ 0; 1 ], and b s to:
subject to, for each i = 1; :::; n:
Expression (6) re ‡ects the fact that when distribution H i (s) prevails, the utility imple-
SATA is deployed to supply transmission services when s > b s and to supply market services when s b s. The constraints in expression (5) ensure the utility secures nonnegative expected pro…t whether it implements TCE or SATA. V 0 will denote the maximized value of
i J i at the solution to [RP] . 16 We follow the standard convention by ensuring that when the utility is indi¤erent among multiple actions, it undertakes the action preferred by the regulator. 17 We assume b K Si 2 ( K S ; K S ) for each i 2 f1; :::; ng at the solution to [RP] . This will be the case if, for instance, K S is su¢ ciently small and K S is su¢ ciently large relative to K T .
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The interaction between the regulator and the utility proceeds as follows. First, the utility learns privately the …xed cost of SATA (K S ) and the prevailing distribution of the congestion probability (H i (s)). Second, the regulator speci…es payments to the utility (P T and P S ), the extent of revenue sharing (f ), and the critical congestion probability ( b s ) that determines whether SATA is assigned to deliver transmission or market services. Third, the utility decides whether to implement TCE or SATA. Fourth, the actual congestion probability (s) is realized and observed publicly. Fifth, if SATA has been implemented, it is assigned to provide transmission services if s > b s whereas it is assigned to supply market services if s b s. Finally, if SATA is implemented and s b s, the revenue SATA generates in supplying market services is realized, and the fraction 1 f is delivered to consumers.
Benchmarks
Before characterizing the optimal regulatory policy in the setting of primary interest, we brie ‡y explain the optimal policy in four benchmark settings.
Full Information Setting
First consider the full information setting, in which the regulator shares the utility's knowledge of K S and H i (s) from the outset of their relationship. In this setting, the regulator dictates the e¢ cient (welfare-maximizing) asset choice and SATA assignment while eliminating the utility's rent.
The regulator ensures the e¢ cient SATA assignment by requiring it to supply market services if and only if the corresponding expected welfare exceeds the expected welfare from supplying transmission services, i.e.,
It is readily veri…ed that:
Thus, in the full information setting, SATA is deployed to deliver transmission services over a broader range of s realizations as congestion imposes greater social losses (L e ) and as the variable cost of SATA operation (v) increases. 18 In contrast, SATA is deployed to deliver market services over a broader range of s realizations when the market services generate higher levels of revenue (R 0 ; R 1 ) and/or incremental consumer welfare (M 0 ; M 1 ).
The regulator ensures the e¢ cient asset choice in the full information setting by specifying payments that induce the utility to implement SATA if and only if the associated expected welfare exceeds the expected welfare from implementing TCE. This is the case
is the aggregate expected welfare (not counting the …xed cost, K S ) SATA generates when
This expected welfare is the di¤erence between: (i) expected revenue and incremental consumer welfare when SATA provides market services; and (ii) expected variable SATA costs and expected losses from congestion when SATA provides market services. The regulator can ensure the desired utility behavior while eliminating the utility's rent by setting:
The payments in expression (11), coupled with reimbursement of variable SATA costs, ensure the utility always secures exactly zero pro…t. Because the utility's pro…t does not vary with its asset choice, the utility will implement the asset that maximizes expected welfare, given
The regulator's expected payo¤ in the full information setting is:
Setting Where Utility has Private Knowledge of H i (s) Only
Now suppose the regulator knows the …xed cost of SATA (K S ) but does not share the utility's private knowledge of H i (s). This form of limited information is not constraining for the regulator because as long as she knows K S (and K T ), she can institute the payments in expression (11).
19 Doing so ensures the utility receives the same (zero) pro…t whether it implements TCE or SATA, so the utility will implement the welfare-maximizing asset choice, given the prevailing H i (s) distribution. Consequently, the regulator's expected payo¤ in this setting is V 1 .
Setting with Symmetric Uncertainty about H i (s) Only.
Next suppose the regulator observes K S and K T before setting P S , P T , f , and b s, but neither she nor the utility knows the prevailing H i (s) distribution. Both parties believe H i (s) prevails with probability i 2 (0; 1). The regulator can again eliminate the utility's rent by setting P T = K T , P S = K S , and f = 0 in this setting. The regulator will also ensure the e¢ cient SATA assignment by setting b s = s . In addition, SATA will be implemented if and only if it generates a higher level of expected welfare than TCE, i.e.,
The regulator's expected payo¤ in this setting is:
19 The regulator can also set b s = s to ensure the e¢ cient deployment of SATA.
S is a constant that does not vary with the prevailing H i (s) distribution. In contrast, the regulator can choose a di¤erent b K Si for each i 2 f1; :::; ng to match the prevailing H i (s) distribution in the full information setting.
Setting Where Utility has Private Knowledge of K S Only
Finally suppose the regulator knows the prevailing H i (s) distribution but does not share the utility's knowledge of K S . In this setting, the regulator sets P S , P T , f , and b s to maximize J i as speci…ed in expression (6). Finding 1 characterizes the optimal regulatory policy in this setting.
Expressions (9) and (15) imply that the largest SATA …xed cost ( b K Si ) for which the utility implements SATA when H i (s) prevails is smaller when the regulator does not know K S than when she knows K S . Thus, asymmetric information about K S leads the regulator to promise the utility relatively modest compensation for implementing SATA. 21 The modest compensation helps to limit the utility's rent when K S is low. However, the relatively low compensation sometimes induces the utility to implement TCE even when expected welfare would be higher if SATA were implemented (i.e., when K S 2 ( b K Si ; K Si )). Therefore, the regulator intentionally induces the prospect of an ine¢ cient asset choice in order to limit the utility's rent.
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The induced ine¢ ciency can be substantial. To illustrate, suppose each of the possible
Further suppose TCE and SATA deliver the same expected welfare when
Then, as Finding 2 reports, the regulator optimally fails to induce the welfare-maximizing asset choice for one quarter of the possible K S realizations. 23 21 Payments need not take the exact form speci…ed in property (iii) of Finding 1. It is only necessary that the utility's expected pro…t is zero when it implements SATA and K S = b K Si . 22 Borgers (2015, p. 22) observes that in related but distinct settings, the regulator e¤ectively acts as if the cost of SATA is the virtual cost
g(K S ) rather than the actual cost K S . The virtual cost accounts for the rent a¤orded the utility when
is implemented even though expected welfare would be higher if SATA were implemented.
The regulator's ex ante expected payo¤ in this setting is V 3 
The Solution to [RP]
Finding 3 records some key features of the optimal regulatory policy in the setting of primary interest where the utility is privately informed about both K S and H i (s).
By setting P T = K T , the regulator eliminates the utility's rent when it implements TCE.
Doing so also limits the payment the regulator must deliver to the utility to induce it to implement SATA rather than TCE when K S is relatively low.
If f = 0, the utility receives none of the revenue that SATA generates when it delivers market services. Consequently, the utility's expected payo¤ is the same whether it implements TCE or SATA, regardless of the prevailing H i (s) distribution. In this case, setting b s 6 = s would be counterproductive for the regulator because doing so would reduce total expected surplus without inducing the utility to use its privileged knowledge of H i (s) to choose between SATA and TCE.
When the regulator cannot observe H i (s), she cannot choose payments to induce the optimal b K Si identi…ed in equation (15) for each H i (s) distribution. Equation (16) indicates that, instead, the regulator essentially sets P T and P S (and f and b s ) to ensure the optimal b K Si are induced in expectation. 24 Thus, relative to the choices between SATA and TCE characterized in equation (15) 
and the expected …xed cost of SATA, EfK S g, is 1 2 K S + K S = 225; 000. K T is taken to be 250; 000, which is approximately 110% of EfK S g.
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For simplicity, the baseline setting assumes there are three equally likely distributions of s (so n = 3 and 1 = 2 = 3 = 1 3
). Each of these distributions is a Beta distribution with parameters and . 29 The baseline setting assumes = 2 and 2 f 1; 3; 16 g to permit 25 Equation (16) implies that the regulator optimally ensures the b K Si identi…ed in equation (15) is approximated relatively closely when H i (s) is likely to prevail (so i is large), ceteris paribus. 26 The baseline setting posits one particular set of model parameters. Substantial variation in these parameters will be considered. 27 American Electric Power has proposed the implementation of a 1 MW SATA and a 0:5 MW SATA to relieve congestion at two substations in Texas (Maloney, 2017) . 28 In practice, TCE costs can either exceed or be less than corresponding SATA costs, depending on the nature and extent of the capacity expansion (Eyer, 2009) . The assumption that EfK S g < K T in the baseline setting is consistent with ongoing reductions in storage capacity costs (Hledik et al., 2018, pp. 12-13) . SATA projects have been supported in several jurisdictions (e.g., Arizonza and New York) recently on the grounds that SATA is less costly than TCE (Chew et al., 2018) . 29 The Beta density is h(s) =
This density is employed because it can assume a wide variety of shapes as its parameters ( ; ) change. The Beta density is symmetric about its mean ( + ) when = , skewed to the left when > > 1, and skewed to the right when > > 1.
14 substantial variation in the potential distributions of s. 30 The corresponding cumulative distribution functions for s are illustrated in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 Here ] California, the ratio of hourly avoided production and capacity costs in peak periods to the corresponding avoided costs in o¤ peak periods is 2:813.
then annual expected cost savings of $102; 065 arise when M 0 +R 0 $74; 084 and M 1 +R 1 $208; 397. 35 For simplicity, the baseline setting rounds these numbers and assumes the cost 30 The substantial variation in these distributions generates signi…cant variation in the expected congestion probability as H i (s) varies. Letting E i fsg denote the expected value of s when H i (s) prevails, E 1 fsg 0:33, E 2 fsg = 0:60, and E 3 fsg 0:89. 31 The regulator will always prefer to implement TCE than risk congestion if savings increase consumer welfare and pro…t symmetrically, so M 0 = R 0 v = 37; 500 and
The baseline setting further assumes the variable cost of SATA (v) is the sum of the cost of the electricity required to recharge the battery and depreciation cost. The battery is assumed to be re-charged during o¤-peak hours each day (Brattle, 2015; Arciniegas and Hittinger, 2018) . E3 (2018) estimates the wholesale marginal cost of electricity in California during o¤-peak hours to be $37:13/MWh. The corresponding annual cost is approximately $13; 552 ( 365 $37:13).
Annual depreciation cost is estimated as the product of annual battery decay and the expected …xed cost of SATA (225; 000). The annual battery decay is approximated as the ratio of the annual number of charge and discharge cycles (365) and the estimated battery cycle life (6; 500). 36 Thus, the annual depreciation cost is taken to be approximately 12; 635 ( 365 6;500 225; 000). The sum of this depreciation cost and the recharging cost is 26; 187.
Re ‡ecting this estimate, the baseline setting assumes v = 25; 000. Arteaga et al. (2017) report battery cycle lives between 3; 000 and 10; 000. We employ the mid-point of this range (6; 500) and, for simplicity, abstract from the nonlinear battery depreciation rates that prevail in practice. 37 We specify [RP] as a mixed complementarity program (MCP). We employ the software GAMS and the PATH solver to identify the solution to the MCP. Because the identi…ed solution to nonlinear programs can be sensitive to the starting values, we employ a Monte Carlo approach that randomly selects 1,000 starting values and solves the MCP for each set of values. We observe systematic convergence to a unique solution to our MCP. 38 The entries for P S and f in the full information setting are not unique. One way to ensure the e¢ cient implementation of SATA is to compensate the utility (only) for its realized costs regardless of its asset choice (i.e., set P T = K T , P S = K S , and f = 0).
. 40 The entries for Table 1 are rounded to the nearest whole number. The entries for f and b s are rounded to the nearest ten-thousandth.
b V is the di¤erence between the maximized value of the regulator's objective function and the corresponding value when SATA is not available (so TCE is always implemented). though expected welfare would be higher if SATA were implemented. As noted above, the relatively modest compensation for implementing SATA helps to limit the rent the utility secures when K S turns out to be low.
Second, f is strictly positive, so revenue sharing is implemented. The revenue sharing ensures the utility's expected pro…t when it implements SATA is higher if the realized congestion probability (s) is low (i.e., s b s ) than if it is high (i.e., s > b s , so SATA is assigned to supply transmission services). When b s is relatively small, the likelihood that s b s typically is substantially higher when congestion is unlikely (e.g., when H 1 (s) prevails) than when congestion is likely (e.g., when H 3 (s) prevails). Thus, revenue sharing (f > 0) serves to render SATA implementation relatively pro…table for the utility when it knows congestion is 41 Speci…cally, b V = V 1 ( K T ) = V 1 + 250; 000 in the full information setting, whereas b V = V 0 + 250; 000 for the solution to [RP] . The regulator's expected payo¤ is expressed relative to her expected payo¤ in the absence of SATA to facilitate a focus on positive numbers. 42 Observe, in particular, that P S = 165; 542 < EfK S g = 225; 000 at the solution to [RP] .
unlikely. Consequently, revenue sharing can help to induce the utility to employ its superior knowledge of H i (s) to implement SATA when congestion is relatively unlikely (and K S is relatively small) and to implement TCE when congestion is relatively likely.
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Third, the utility commands considerable rent from its private knowledge of K S and H i (s). This rent is almost 50% of the regulator's expected gain from having SATA available at the solution to [RP] . 44 As explained further below, the rent arises primarily from the utility's superior knowledge of the …xed cost of implementing SATA.
Fourth, the regulator's expected gain from SATA is considerably lower in the presence of the prevailing information asymmetries than in their absence. As Table 1 reports, information asymmetries reduce the expected gain from SATA by approximately 50% in the baseline setting.
45 Table 1 also reports that b s exceeds s in the baseline setting, so SATA is assigned to provide market services for some s realizations (s 2 (s ; b s )) for which expected welfare would be higher if SATA were assigned to provide transmission services. More generally, b s can either exceed or be less than s at the solution to [RP] . The optimal deviation between b s and s is designed to render SATA (TCE) implementation relatively pro…table for the utility when congestion is relatively unlikely (likely). To illustrate, suppose s realizations just above (below) s are more likely when H 1 (s) prevails than when H 3 (s) prevails. In this case, the regulator often will set b s above (below) s in order to expand the range of s realizations for which the utility can pro…t from using SATA to provide market services when H 1 (s) prevails more than when H 3 (s) prevails.
Tables A1 -A16 in the Appendix record how the optimal regulatory policy and industry 43 When b s is large, the probability that s b s can be similar under all H i (s) distributions. Consequently, revenue sharing may cede rent to the utility without rendering SATA implementation substantially more pro…table for the utility when congestion is unlikely (e.g., when H 1 (s) prevails) than when congestion is likely (e.g., when H 3 (s) prevails). Numerical solutions indicate that f often is close to 0 (and can even be 0) at the solution to [RP] when b s is relatively high (which is the case, for instance, when M 0 , M 1 , R 0 , and R 1 are large). 44 From the last two entries in the last row of outcomes change as elements of the baseline setting change. Table A1 reports that the regulator's expected gain from SATA ( b V ) and the utility's rent (Ef g) can both increase substantially as the cost of TCE (K T ) increases. As K T increases, the regulator induces the utility to implement SATA over a broader range of K S realizations (i.e., Ef b
, which increases both b V and Ef g.
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Tables A2 and A3 report that b V and Ef g decline as K S increases or K S increases, ceteris paribus. A higher …xed cost of SATA tends to limit its implementation, which reduces the regulator's expected gain from SATA and the utility's rent. 47 Perhaps more surprisingly, Table A4 indicates that the regulator's expected payo¤ from SATA can increase as K S K S increases, holding the expected value of K S constant. One might suspect that "increased uncertainty"(i.e., an increase in K S K S ) would harm the regulator. However, this is not necessarily the case because increases in K S K S that entail a reduction in K S lower the expected SATA cost in the "relevant region," i.e., for those K S realizations for which the regulator optimally induces the utility to implement SATA. Corresponding increases in K S are relatively inconsequential because the utility is induced to implement TCE for the higher K S realizations. Table A6 .) 49 In both cases, the reduced utility pro…t re ‡ects reduced implementation of SATA. 46 To illustrate, when K T increases by 25% (from 200; 000 to 250; 000), b V increases by approximately 145% (from 7; 812 to 19; 103) and Ef g also increases by approximately 145% (from 3; 906 to 9; 551). These substantial increases re ‡ect in part the 17:4% increase in Ef b K S g (from 143; 953 to 168; 953) that arises when K T increases from 200; 000 to 250; 000. The utility's rent increases as SATA implementation expands because the utility secures no rent when it implements TCE (because P T = K T at the solution to [RP] ). 47 To illustrate, when K S increases from 100; 000 to 125; 000, b V declines from 19; 103 to 14; 258 and Ef g declines from 9; 551 to 7; 129.
48 For example, as v increases from 25; 000 to 30; 000, b V declines from 19; 103 to 18; 301 and Ef g declines from 9; 551 to 9; 150. 49 To illustrate, as L e increases from 750; 000 to 800; 000, b V declines from 19; 103 to 19; 031 and Ef g declines from 9; 551 to 9; 515.
Tables A7 -A9 illustrate the changes that arise as the prevailing H i (s) distributions change. An increase in the mean of any H i (s) distribution tends to reduce the expected gain from SATA ( b V ), in part by reducing the likelihood that SATA is implemented. 50 Table   A10 shows that as high congestion probabilities become systematically more likely, SATA is implemented less often, which reduces b V and Ef g. 51 In contrast, b V and Ef g increase as the H 1 (s) and H 3 (s) become more likely and the H 2 (s) distribution becomes correspondingly less likely. (See Table A11 .) 52 The increases in b V and Ef g arise in this case primarily because the increased likelihood of the H 1 (s) distribution leads to a substantial increase in the probability that SATA is implemented.
Tables A12 -A15 report that b V and Ef g increase modestly as the revenue or the incremental consumer welfare that arises when SATA supplies market services increases.
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Larger values of M 0 , M 1 , R 0 , or R 1 promote expanded implementation of SATA (i.e., Ef b K S g increases) and increased deployment of SATA to deliver market services (i.e., b s increases), both of which increase the regulator's expected gain from SATA and the utility's expected pro…t. 54 Table A16 reports that outcomes similar to those that arise in the baseline setting persist as n, the number of possible distributions of s, increases.
Tables 1 and A1 -A16 indicate that the utility often secures substantial rent under the optimal regulatory policy. To determine the primary source of this rent, it is useful to compare outcomes in the benchmark settings considered in Section 3. Table 2 reports outcomes in the benchmark setting of Section 3.4 where the regulator and the utility both know the prevailing H i (s), but only the utility knows the realization of K S .
The last row of data in Table 2 records outcomes under what we call a "Rule of Thumb" policy, which is designed to re ‡ect policies that have been proposed in practice and may have intuitive appeal. Under the Rule of Thumb policy, the regulator reimburses the utility for the …xed expected cost of the asset it implements (in addition to reimbursing the variable cost of employing SATA). Thus, P T = K T and P S = EfK S g. In addition, the utility is awarded one-half of the revenue it generates when SATA supplies market services (so f = 0:5).
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Furthermore, b s is set at 0:05, so SATA is assigned to supply transmission services whenever the realized congestion probability exceeds 5%. This compensation structure is consistent with the CAISO full cost-of-service plus revenue sharing policy. CAISO observes that a policy of this sort provides "incentives for the [utility] to participate in the market by allowing [it] to retain some percentage of the market revenue" while eliminating the utility's "risk of not being able to at least recover the full cost of the resource" (CAISO, 2018b, p. 17) . 56 When b s = 0:05, the probability of unmitigated congestion (i.e., the probability that SATA supplies market services and congestion arises), is Figure 1 .) The ability to dictate the deployment of SATA after observing the realized congestion probability helps to limit the losses from having to choose between SATA and TCE without knowing the prevailing H i (s) distribution. 58 Furthermore, the realization of s serves as an ex post signal that is correlated with the utility's privileged knowledge of
When the regulator knows K S , she can employ the signal to induce the utility to implement SATA only when congestion is relatively unlikely without ceding much rent to the utility. She can do so by rewarding the utility only when the realization of s is relatively low following the implementation of SATA (by setting f > 0 and assigning SATA to supply market services only when s < b s ).
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In contrast, the regulator's expected gain from SATA declines substantially when the utility is privately informed about K S , even when the regulator and the utility both know the prevailing H i (s) distribution. The …rst and third rows of data in Table 2 indicate that asymmetric information about K S alone reduces the regulator's expected gain from SATA by approximately 50%. 60 The reduction arises from two primary sources. First, the utility secures substantial rent when K S is low because P S and f are set to ensure the utility implements SATA for both low and moderate values of K S . Second, when P S and f are 57 38;220 38;036 38;220 0:005. The limited extent of this decline re ‡ects in part the fact that the regulator can eliminate the utility's rent in this benchmark setting where the utility has no private information. The b V entry in the second row of data in Table 2 is the value of V 2 (from Section 3.3) in the baseline setting. 58 Recall from Section 3.2 that if the utility alone knows H i (s) but the regulator and utility both know K S , the regulator can achieve the same expected gain she secures in the full information setting. 59 Cremér and McLean (1988) , Riordan and Sappington (1988), and Gary-Bobo and Spiegel (2006) , among others, demonstrate how a principal can employ an ex post signal that is correlated with an agent's private information to limit the agent's rent while inducing the agent to reveal the information truthfully. Table 2 is V 3 (from Section 3.4) in the baseline setting. 22 reduced to limit the utility's rent, the utility often implements TCE when expected welfare would be higher if SATA were implemented. The regulator's incremental loss from asymmetric knowledge of both H i (s) and K S rather than just K S is limited in the baseline setting (and more generally). The third and fourth rows of data in Table 2 report that the regulator's expected gain from SATA at the solution to [RP] is less than 0:1% below her expected gain from SATA in the benchmark setting where she shares the utility's knowledge of H i (s) but not its knowledge of K S .
61 Again, the ability to dictate how SATA is deployed after s is realized helps to limit the regulator's loss from limited knowledge of the prevailing distribution of s.
Implementation of the Rule of Thumb policy substantially reduces the regulator's expected gain from SATA ( b V ) and generates considerable rent for the utility (Ef g) in the baseline setting. Under the Rule of Thumb policy, b V declines by more than 70% whereas Ef g increases by more than 230% relative to their values at the solution to [RP] . 62 Table   3 helps to explain these e¤ects. The …rst column in the table records a single modi…cation of the identi…ed Rule of Thumb policy. 63 The last two columns report the values of b V and
Ef g that arise under the corresponding modi…ed Rule of Thumb policy. The …rst two rows of data record the e¤ects of changing the critical congestion probability ( b s ). In the …rst row, b s is increased to its level (0:1273) at the solution to [RP] . In the second row, b s is reduced to 0:01, so SATA is deployed to supply transmission services whenever the realized congestion probability exceeds 1%.
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The third and fourth rows of data in Table 3 report the e¤ects of changing the utility's share of the revenue generated when SATA provides market services. In the third row, f 0:0004. This conclusion implies that the regulator would achieve at most a very small percentage increase in her expected payo¤ if she were to o¤er the utility a menu of compensation structures and allow the utility to select its preferred option from the menu, as in La¤ont and Tirole (1993) , for example. Brown and Sappington (2019) 63 Other elements of the Rule of Thumb policy remain unchanged in each case considered in Table 3 . 64 When b s = 0:01, the expected probability of unmitigated congestion (
23 is set at 0:6232, its value at the solution to [RP] . In the fourth row, f is reduced to 0:25.
The last three rows in Table 3 consider changes in the base payment for implementing SATA (P S ). In the …fth row of data, P S is set at 165; 542, its value at the solution to [RP] . In the sixth row, P S is reduced to 112; 500, one-half of the expected …xed cost of SATA. In the last row, P S is set at 224; 792, which is the di¤erence between the expected …xed cost of SATA (EfK S g) and an approximation of the utility's expected revenue (EfRg) from employing SATA to supply market services. Formally, EfRg
where f = 0:5 and b s = 0:05. EfK S g = 112; 500 7; 822 544 P S = EfK S g EfRg = 224; 792 5; 153 31; 250 Table 3 . E¤ects of Modifying Elements of the Rule of Thumb Policy Table 3 indicates that the base payment for SATA (P S ) plays a central role in determining the performance of the prevailing regulatory policy. When P S is set at its optimal level (i.e., at its level in the solution to [RP] ), the regulator secures nearly the same gain from SATA that she achieves under the optimal policy even though b s and f di¤er signi…cantly from their optimal levels. 66 In contrast, b V remains far below its optimal value when either b s or f is set 65 EfRg = 208 in the baseline setting. EfRg overstates the utility's actual expected revenue from supplying market services because it does not account for the fact the utility will sometimes implement TCE rather than SATA. 66 Under this modi…ed Rule of Thumb policy, f is 19:74% ( 
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at its optimal value but P S is set equal to the expected …xed cost of SATA.
67;68
Table 3 also indicates that the gain from SATA can be relatively low both if P S is reduced only moderately below the full expected cost of SATA or if P S is reduced well below EfK S g.
A moderate reduction in P S below EfK S g (e.g., P S = EfK S g EfRg) a¤ords the utility considerable rent, thereby reducing b V . A substantial reduction in P S can limit the utility's rent. However, it can also induce the utility to implement TCE when expected welfare would be higher if SATA were implemented, thereby foregoing much of the potential increase in surplus that SATA can provide. 69 Speci…cally, if P S is reduced to Tables A1 -A15 . The average value of r is these settings is 0:74, and r varies between 0:52 and 0:86. The smallest value of r arises when K T is small, so P S is optimally set at a relatively small level to avoid excessive implementation of SATA. 70 The largest value of r arises when K S K S is small, so P S is optimally set relatively close to EfK S g in light of the relatively limited information asymmetry regarding K S .
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5 Conclusions.
We have examined the design of policies to motivate both the appropriate choice between TCE and SATA and subsequent SATA deployment. Our analysis provides four primary con- 67 The substantial reduction in b V arises even though the Rule of Thumb policy often induces the utility to implement the asset that maximizes expected welfare. In the baseline setting, Ef b K S g 228; 376 under the Rule of Thumb policy and Ef b K S g 237; 906 under the optimal policy in the full information setting. Thus, the expected maximum K S realization for which SATA is implemented is fairly similar under these two policies. (In contrast, Ef b K S g 168; 953 at the solution to [RP] in the baseline setting.) 68 b V also remains well below its optimal value (i.e., its value at the solution to [RP]) if b s and f are both set equal to their values at the solution to [RP] but P S = 1 2 EfK S g. In this case, b V = 7; 848 and Ef g = 549.
69 Ef b K S g = 113; 548 under the modi…ed Rule of Thumb policy with P S = 1 2 EfK S g. Ef b K S g = 168; 953 at the solution to [RP] . 70 See the …rst row of data in Table A17 . 71 See the …rst row of data in Table A20.   25 clusions. First, the optimal payment to the utility for implementing SATA typically is substantially below the expected cost of acquiring, installing, and integrating SATA. The relatively modest compensation reduces the rent the utility secures from its privileged knowledge of this cost.
Second, the optimal policy often awards the utility a substantial share of the revenue it derives from employing SATA to supply market services. 72 Because revenue sharing serves to reward the utility when SATA is ultimately deployed to supply market services, it can help to motivate the utility to employ its superior knowledge of local industry conditions to implement SATA only when congestion is relatively unlikely and SATA costs are relatively low. Third, limited knowledge of the utility's cost of implementing SATA is particularly constraining for the regulator. Her limited knowledge of the probability of local congestion (s) typically is substantially less constraining. The relatively small losses from limited ex ante knowledge of s stem in part from the fact that the relevant local congestion probability is observed publicly before SATA must be assigned to deliver either market services or transmission services. Fourth, it is not possible to specify a single, simple policy that is optimal in all settings.
Even in our streamlined model, the various elements of the regulatory environment interact in complex ways, thereby precluding a simple characterization of the optimal policy. However, we found that the performance of the regulatory policy is particularly sensitive to the speci…ed payment (P S ) for implementing SATA. It is often optimal to reduce P S well below the expected cost of implementing SATA (EfK S g). Although small values of P S can induce the utility to implement TCE when welfare would be higher if SATA were implemented, small values of P S enable consumers to secure the bene…ts of SATA at relatively low cost when K S is relatively small. Substantial reductions in P S below EfK S g can be particularly advantageous when substantial revenue sharing is implemented and considerable revenue 72 The utility is optimally awarded more than half of the revenue it generates in each of the settings considered in Tables A1 -A14 in the Appendix. Smaller values of f can be optimal if s is relatively high, so SATA is often employed to deliver market services.
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from employing SATA to supply market services is anticipated.
These conclusions have three primary implications for regulatory policy design. First, policies that set compensation for SATA (P S ) equal to its expected cost (EfK S g) can deliver substantial rent to utilities and thereby diminish consumer welfare. Even policies that reduce P S below EfK S g by the amount of the utility's expected revenue from employing SATA to supply market services typically a¤ord substantial rent to the utility. Larger reductions in P S can bene…t consumers even though they sometimes induce the utility to implement TCE when welfare would be higher if SATA were implemented.
Second, revenue sharing often serves consumers well. As noted above, compensation for implementing SATA (P S ) can be reduced by (at least) the amount of revenue the utility expects to secure via revenue sharing. This reduction in P S ensures that revenue sharing does not automatically deliver excessive rent to the utility. In addition, revenue sharing can help to induce the utility to implement SATA only when local congestion is relatively unlikely (so SATA is likely to be deployed to supply market services) and the cost of SATA is relatively low.
Third, e¤orts by regulators to improve their knowledge of prevailing industry conditions typically is best directed at reducing uncertainty about the utility's cost of acquiring, installing, and integrating SATA. For example, regulators might require utilities to …le carefully-documented studies of the cost of SATA implementation. Regulators might also encourage corresponding studies by independent experts, and share available studies across regulatory jurisdictions.
Conceivably, our primary …ndings could re ‡ect the relatively simple regulatory policies we analyzed. It is possible, for instance, that the regulator might be able to secure substantially greater gains for consumers if the …xed payment for implementing SATA could be higher when SATA delivers market services than when it is ultimately deployed to provide transmission services. Although such a reward structure can increase consumer welfare by helping to induce the utility to implement SATA only when congestion is relatively unlikely and the cost of SATA is low, consumer gains from the policy typically are very small. 73 To illustrate, the regulator's ability to implement this more general reward structure increases expected consumer welfare by less than 1% in the baseline setting.
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In closing, we suggest four extensions of our study that merit further analysis. First, the e¤ects of utility risk aversion should be analyzed. It seems likely that when the utility is averse to risk, the regulator will optimally increase the utility's …xed compensation for implementing SATA and reduce revenue sharing. Second, variation in the severity of congestion and in the amount of SATA that can be implemented should be considered. Under such conditions, the welfare-maximizing policy may entail simultaneous investment in TCE and SATA. Third, policies that encourage competitive deployment of SATA deserve further study. Such policies have the potential to help to limit utility rent and reduce expected energy costs. Fourth, the full impact of expanded SATA participation in wholesale electricity and ancillary services markets warrants further research. Issues that may merit particular attention include the e¤ects of expanded SATA activity on the earnings (and thus on the investment and participation decisions) of natural gas generators. 73 The corresponding gains that arise if the regulator is not required to reimburse the utility's variable SATA cost also tend to be very small. 74 Speci…cally, the regulator's expected gain from SATA increases by approximately 0: 004% ( 19;180 19;103 19;103 ). The limited extent of this gain re ‡ects the fact that f can be employed to deliver much the same incentive that di¤erential …xed SATA payments can provide. Numerical solutions also indicate that only very small gains arise if the regulator can explicitly penalize the utility when it implements SATA and congestion occurs.
Appendix
Section I of this appendix presents additional numerical solutions to [RP] . Section II presents the proofs of the formal conclusions in the text.
I. Additional Numerical Solutions.
The tables that follow record outcomes at the solution to [RP] as parameters in the baseline setting change. The …rst column in each table identi…es the values of the single parameter that changes. (All other parameters remain at their levels in the baseline setting.) The variables whose values are recorded in the tables are those reported in Table 1 in the text. 150,000 190,542 0.6228 0.1274 200,454 190,863 190,542 6,510 In Table A10 , 1 is the amount by which 1 is reduced below 1 3 and 3 is increased above 2 166,286 0.5749 0.1272 175,418 166,580 166,286 10,194 20,388 -0.1 165,846 0.6032 0.1272 175,433 166,156 165,846 9,873 19,745 0 165,542 0.6232 0.1273 175,454 165,863 165,542 9,551 19,103 0.1 165,319 0.6387 0.1274 175,487 165,649 165,319 9,230 18,460 0.2 165,149 0.6532 0.1277 175,568 165,488 165,149 8,909 17,818 In Table A11 , 2 is the amount by which 1 and 3 are increased above 20,000 165,609 0.6401 0.1006 173,660 165,772 165,609 9,371 18,742 30,000 165,574 0.6251 0.1161 174,640 165,817 165,574 9,469 18,937 37,500 165,542 0.6232 0.1273 175,454 165,863 165,542 9,551 19,103 40,000 165,530 0.6239 0.1310 175,739 165,880 165,530 9,581 19,161 50,000 165,479 0.6319 0.1455 176,950 165,963 165,479 9,706 19,413 
,500 165,733 1.0000 0.0890 172,804 165,848 165,733 9,305 18,614 50,000 165,591 0.7681 0.1084 174,135 165,794 165,591 9,418 18,836 62,500 165,542 0.6232 0.1273 175,454 165,863 165,542 9,551 19,103 75,000 165,482 0.5387 0.1455 176,949 165,960 165,482 9,706 19,413 87,500 165,409 0.4854 0.1629 178,606 166,091 165,409 9,883 19,667 78,000 165,572 0.6816 0.1170 175,090 165,826 165,572 9,514 19,028 104,000 165,558 0.6523 0.1219 175,264 165,843 165,558 9,532 19,064 130,000 165,542 0.6232 0.1273 175,454 165,863 165,542 9,551 19,103 156,000 165,523 0.5944 0.1332 175,660 165,886 165,523 9,572 19,145 182,000 165,501 0.5658 0.1397 175,885 165,914 165,501 9,596 19,191 Table A16 . Outcomes in the Baseline Setting with n = 5 and n = 20.
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The following tables report the values of P S and r P S EfK S g EfRg at the solution to [RP] . 82 All parameters other than the one identi…ed in the …rst column of a The …rst and third rows of data in Table A14 report outcomes in the full information (FI) setting. i = 1 n for i = 1; :::; n in all settings considered in the table. For the setting with n = 5, 1 = 1, 2 = 1:5, 3 = 3, 4 = 7, and 5 = 16. For the setting with n = 20, 1 = 1 and i = i 1 + 0:25 for i = 2; :::; n. These parameter values ensure the expected probability of congestion, n P i = 1 i E i fsg, is similar when n = 3 (0:6074), n = 5 (0:6057), and n = 20 (0:5971). 82 Recall that EfRg 83 E f K S K S g = 225; 000 in all cases in Table A18 . 
Proof of Finding 1
The proof parallels the proof of Finding 3, and so is omitted.
Proof of Finding 2 (15) implies that when G(K S ) is the uniform distribution, SATA is optimally implemented whenever:
(29) re ‡ects the fact that:
Conclusion (iii) in the Finding follows from (24) and (27).
Conclusion (i) follows from (1) and (5) if T > 0. Summing (26) and (27) provides:
To prove Conclusion (ii) in the Finding, observe from (29) that if f = 0:
= s .
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Figure . The Cumulative Distribution Functions for in the Baseline Setting.
